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Introduction 
In the 1990s as the internet
phenomenon generated new ways
of undertaking transactions that
replace the traditional paper format,
countries began to adapt their legal
frameworks to give legal status to
electronic signatures, digital records
and in some cases, digital signatures
and ‘authentication’ technologies.
Digital certificates became an important part of
the methodologies used to secure communications
on the web, to assure secure internet sessions, to
protect confidential documents, and to replace
handwritten signatures in many activities that need
strong authentication. In many other situations
involving electronic transactions, technical
advances have developed a range of solutions that
do not use digital signatures but which also can be
suitable for strong authentication.
These technological developments also provided
new ways of undertaking government commerce
or procurement, and more and more governments
are taking advantage of this potential. With public
procurement accounting for up to twenty percent
or more of Gross Domestic Product, government
policy in this area represents an opportunity to
establish new standards of governance not only
within government but also more broadly within
the economy. This can be especially valuable for
developing countries where this technology has
the capacity to significantly strengthen the
transparency, value-for-money and efficiency of
public processes. It is this opportunity that makes
e-commerce applications in the public sector, or
electronic government procurement (e-GP), hold
special interest to multilateral development banks
(MDBs) and other international agencies such as
the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL). The application of this
technology to government procurement is now
being promoted by the MDBs in terms of a
framework of core principles that target these
benefits.
This paper discusses the MDB guidelines
towards authentication and digital signatures
within the context of e-GP and the core principles,
and some of the tensions and outstanding issues
around these. The MDBs have already initiated
discussion on some of the issues around
authentication and have created a joint website to
facilitate debate.1
Electronic Government
Procurement
Electronic government procurement is defined
as the use of information technology systems,
means and networks by governments in order to
obtain works, goods, services and consulting
services required for the public sector, and to
manage their procurement relationship with
suppliers and contractors.
To appreciate the issues around authentication
in e-GP (or any other form of commerce), it is
essential to understand the underlying business
framework to which it is being applied. The on-
line applications that are being adopted by
governments in relation to electronic public
procurement are broadly in three parts:
n Electronic tendering (or bidding)
n Electronic purchasing including electronic 
reverse auctions, and
n Electronic contract management.
These are different technical systems that can
stand alone or be combined along some common
ground such as performance management and
reporting. Most successful government
developments are in relation to e-tendering, which
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is often considered to be the easiest part to
implement, as it does not require substantial re-
engineering of government and business back-
office systems. This function commonly advertises
government policies, procurement regulations and
tendering opportunities and allows businesses to
download tender documents and upload bids into
an on-line tender box. This function typically does
not handle large financial transactions that might
be associated with the tenders being advertised
and submitted. There can be relatively minor
financial transactions where countries charge for
document downloads, bid submissions or other
levels of participation, for example to cover the
costs of the e-GP system. Yet it is with this
function, for which identity risk might seem small,
that some countries seek to impose strong
authentication methodologies.
n Authentication and Public
Administration
There are three broad solution areas for on-line
authentication in e-GP (and e-commerce
generally). First there have been technological
developments, which, of course, gave rise to PKI
models based on digital signatures and certificates.
Further technological developments have been
making other options available such as bionics.
Second there is the legislative path where most
countries have now implemented laws to give
legal status to electronic or digital documents and
electronic authentication. Until recently it seemed
that lawyers and technologists were evolving some
sort of consensus (but by no means unanimous)
about on-line authentication. The first of these
laws were often not technologically neutral and
specified a PKI solution. The weaknesses of this
bias has gradually become evident and new laws
are now shifting towards technological neutrality.
Finally there is the administrative response to
on-line authentication. Here there can often be
found a strong polarization between the public
and private sectors. Within the private sector,
business practice has, to a large degree, ignored
developments both in the legislation and in the
technology in relation to authentication, and more
often relied on traditional processes and risk
management. This has been a reflection of the
way business actually works, drawing on
established alliances and networks. Authentication
in B2B commerce usually derives from relationship
management, and is unlikely to be dictated by
technology or the law.
Within the public sector however,
authentication does not derive from relationship
management but from process management or
administrative law, or alternatively from legislatively
consistent PKI. Thus some governments appear to
be approaching e-GP authentication via the legal
path and specifying PKI processes, while others
have adopted a management or administrative
path that has no such requirements but instead
relies on traditional practice. Examples of this
divergence of approach can readily be found, with
e-GP in India and Latin America using digital
signatures and PKI, while in parts of the USA,
Australia and the UK using electronic signatures or
simply administrative processes. The MDB e-GP
Harmonization Group has developed an Interactive
Database in order to provide member countries
information on e-GP practices adopted by
governments worldwide.2
Countries have confronted authentication issues
in relation to bid submissions from business.
However, as already noted, the e-bidding systems
often charge nothing at all and handle no financial
transfers. Also, while these systems advertise
opportunities and receive bids, they typically do
not formalize any contracts on-line. The contract
formalization is usually off-line sometimes pending
negotiations, due diligence or other procedures.
The need for on-line authentication by bidders
requires explanation. Under what circumstances
would a bidder submit a bid then deny that they
did so? And further, do these circumstances
actually happen and with what frequency? What
are the risks to government?
It is sometimes noted that the risks are indeed
high. For example, governments are increasingly
accepting tenders from business through the
internet, and while at the tender stage there has
been no financial transfer, the intellectual property
within a high value technology tender or even a
construction contract can easily be valued at
millions of dollars. Either the business does not
compete or it accepts the use of government
specified PKI/SSL lodgement technology only some
of which might be regarded as having best
practice security. But these are issues of security
rather than identity.
Some governments claim that they want legal
commitment from bidders to address these
questions and to hold to their bids, and that a
digital signature provides this. However other
governments have adopted administrative
approaches to these risks, recognising that there
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are likely to be administrative or regulatory
responses to the threat that bidders will withdraw
a bid after tenders have closed. Also, businesses
are not anxious to upset government buyers, and
a regulation that late bid withdrawal will disqualify
a bidder from future bidding, as is the case in
some jurisdictions, represents one simple
administrative alternative to the attachment of a
digital signature. In relation to the potential for the
transmission of unauthorized bids, some
governments, by requiring a digital signature, are
requiring bidders to provide strong evidence that
they authorized the bid, while other governments
using administrative approaches require bidders to
provide strong evidence that they did not
authorize a bid should the issue arise. This
polarization of government methodology implicitly
reflects differences in the management of
underlying business risks that have not always
been fully analysed.
The MDBs and E-GP 
The Asian Development Bank, the Inter-
American Development Bank and the World Bank
have been harmonizing their approaches to
promoting these technological applications in the
public sector of developing countries specifically to
strengthen governance in this component of
government appropriation.
Clearly this technology can strengthen poor
governance just as easily as it can enhance good
governance, and therefore the guidelines and rules
these MDBs have established for developing
countries become important. The harmonised
approach developed between these Banks has
been in recognition of the importance of providing
consistent advice and guidance to developing
countries in relation to these technological
applications.
The MDBs have a significant catalytic role in
developing countries in this major area of
expenditure through their capacity to attach
conditions to the loans, grants and credits that
they provide to these countries. The MDBs have an
additional legitimate leadership role to play in
setting standards and design parameters in relation
to e-GP for their borrower countries. The MDBs
have responsibilities to their donor countries, other
borrower countries and their own governance
frameworks to ensure that the processes used by
borrowing countries to disperse MDB loans and
liabilities meet acceptable public governance
standards. This is not new – the MDBs have long
imposed basic standards for the management
processes of these funds within the traditional
paper-based system.
The MDBs have encouraged individual
governments to adopt or develop and implement
e-GP as a means of promoting good governance,
efficiency and technological capacity of their
economies and have provided resources to
facilitate such processes. No one system has been
promoted by the MDBs, but instead they have
encouraged governments to find their own path
that most closely matches their individual
circumstances, recognizing that there is no single
“right” solution. It is within these various home
grown paths and solutions that the MDBs have
defined core principles that need to be
incorporated if the systems are to be applied to
MDB-sourced funds.
n E-GP Core Principles
As with traditional paper based procurement,
the MDB standards for e-GP rely on a battery of
core principles that must be observed. These
principles are:
n Transparency
n Non discrimination
n Equality of access
n Open competition
n Accountability 
n Security of process
The effective implementation of these core
principles implies that such technical requirements
must be applied to the electronic procurement
systems. These principles must be present in the
following procurement systems requirements:
n Bid advertising
n Technological neutrality
n Technical standards for interoperability and 
security
n Some processes such as ensuring security and 
good audit trails
n Cost and easy participation
Where executing agencies use e-GP systems
operated by a third party under a service contract
arrangement, then that third party system must
also comply with these requirements. Of particular
interest is the approach used by the MDBs around
the issue of authentication and how this
potentially conflicts with or fits within the core
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framework principles.
n Authentication and E-GP
Like others that have gone before them, the
MDBs have encountered problems around the
concept of on-line authentication within the
context of government procurement that reflect
contractual and risk requirements. In fact,
although PKI technology has been available for
many years and it has legal recognition in most
countries, there has not been an intensive use of
digital signatures by much of business.
The problems of on-line authentication have of
course been extensively documented and will not
be revisited here except by way of a summary of a
survey conducted by the PKI Forum (“PKI Action
Plan”, OASIS Public Key Infrastructure Technical
Committee, 2004).
That survey attracted a large number of
respondents, who identified certain specific issues.
The top five obstacles to PKI deployment and
usage identified by the survey were:
n Software applications do not support it
n Costs are too high
n PKI is poorly understood
n Too much focus on technology, not enough 
on need
n Poor interoperability
For public procurement it is important to
facilitate participation by as many actual and
potential suppliers as possible to encourage real
competition, value-for-money and transparency.
This means that not only should it be possible for
all potential bidders to participate, it should also be
procedurally simple and inexpensive. The principle
of open access with minimal barriers is a core
principle to enhance transparency and reduce
malpractice and back door trade restrictions. For
this requirement, a certified digital signature can
become a barrier for participation at two levels.
First for smaller local and regionally based
domestic suppliers the processes and costs
required to participate in PKI may become a
barrier.
At the other extreme, the lack of standards and
interoperability can discourage participation by
international bidders. Up to now, there are no
international agreements about the recognition of
digital certificates issued for certification authorities
located in different countries reflecting the lack of
standards (or too many standards) and
interoperability. This is a serious problem because
the requirement of personal identification needed
for personal certificates. This means that a person
needs to go to a registration authority to validate
their identification data. This validation requires
personal presence. What happens if the person
lives in another country? As there are no
international agreements between countries and
there are no international rules about the
international validity of digital certificates, this
potentially represents a serious obstacle to the
open and ready participation of bidders and
thereby conflicts with procurement core principles
maintained by the MDBs.
nMDB E-Tendering Guidelines for
Digital Signatures
Facing the obstacles that the use of PKI may
represent for the open access and competition, the
MDBs have approved processes that establish e-
bidding requirements for MDB loans, grants and
credits, which are mandatory for electronic
government procurement implementation.
It is notable that the MDBs do not require that
there be any on-line authentication at all and, as
already discussed, some governments indeed do
not require on-line authentication for e-GP, except
in terms of ordinary administrative processes as is
the case for the great bulk of B2B e-commerce
today. Where a government insists on digitally
certified digital signatures such as PKI, the MDBs
have mandated the following requirements to
protect the core procurement principles:
n The certification process shall certify bidders
for a reasonable period of time (at least one
year) and bidders shall not be required to
request a certification for each bidding
process.
n The certification process shall be kept open
permanently, allowing bidders to submit the
request for certification at any time in order to
allow them to register in advance for future
bidding processes.
n The certification process shall allow bidders to
take all actions required for their certification
within their own countries, without the need
to travel abroad.
n The certification process shall accept an
electronic signature or a digital certification
and signature issued by certifying authorities
within the country of the bidder, or the
process shall accept submission of on-line or
off-line documentation for certifying the
authenticity of the bidder representative,
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accepting such documentation that can be
obtained under commonly used procedures in
the country of the bidder (for example, a
requirement for notarization in a consulate or
embassy would be an unacceptable impost).
n The certification process shall not require
bidders to submit mandatory information with
origin outside a bidder’s own country.
The MDBs do not attempt to develop a model or
business case for PKI but leaves that to the countries
concerned. These rules represent a compromise
between the current state of PKI and business
practicalities and do not pretend to resolve PKI
weaknesses identified earlier. As such these rules are
a defence of the MDB procurement core principles
rather than a model for PKI and these agencies have
correctly refused to bend their procurement
principles to accommodate the technology.
UNCITRAL and E-Commerce 
At the same time as these MDBs were
establishing their position in relation to on-line
authentication, UNCITRAL was revising its 
position on these and related matters and
independently coming to a similar position for 
e-contract Model Law.
Within the e-commerce environment the idea of
non-repudiation has taken on a meaning that
connotes both authorization and security of
process. The vehicle for non-repudiation has, for
some applications, become the certified digital
signature. However, from a legal perspective an
authorization or signature has never meant to
convey assurances of security: the signature was
always to convey the idea of intent.
In general the first of the new e-commerce 
laws enacted by various jurisdictions around the
world reflected a certain lack of distinction
between the notion of intent and the idea of
security or risk management. These laws
sometimes defined valid on-line signatures in terms
of certified digital signatures and PKI. The
UNCITRAL Model Law on E-Signatures was
influenced by these developments and is not
entirely technologically neutral. As the problems
with PKI became evident, the legislation has been
shifting towards a technologically neutral position.
This is also much more consistent with the way in
which B2B interactions generally operate.
A similar approach with regards to
authentication has been adopted by UNCITRAL.
The Draft Convention on the Use of Electronic
Communications in International Contracts,
approved at the Thirty-eighth session in Vienna, 
4-15 July 2005, aimed at enhancing legal certainty
and commercial predictability where electronic
communications are used in relation to
international contracts. The provisions of the Draft
Convention deal with determining a party’s
location in an electronic environment; the time 
and place of dispatch and receipt of electronic
communications; and the use of automated
message systems for contract formation. Other
provisions contain criteria establishing the
functional equivalence between electronic
communications and paper documents - including
“original” paper documents - as well as between
electronic authentication methods and hand-
written signatures. The new Convention will help
assure companies and traders around the world
that contracts negotiated electronically are as valid
and enforceable as traditional paper-based
transactions.
The Draft Convention is based on a pure
technologically neutral approach. It recognizes the
legal validity of the electronic communications,
and stipulates that a communication or a contract
should not be denied validity or enforceability on
the sole ground that it is in the form of an
electronic communication. It also adopts an open
view with respect to form requirements by
considering that nothing in the Convention
requires a communication or a contract to be
made or evidenced in any particular form.
Likewise, it states that where the law has required
that a communication or a contract be in writing,
or has provided consequences for the absence of
written form, those requirements are met by an
electronic communication if the information
contained therein was accessible so as to be usable
for subsequent reference.
With regard to electronic signatures, the Draft
Convention has revisited the Electronic Commerce
Model Law concept and revised the previous
Electronic Signature Model Law approach. It now
provides that where the law has required that a
communication or contract be signed by a party,
or has provided consequences for the absence of a
signature, that requirement is met by an electronic
communication if: 
n A method has been used to identify the party
and to indicate that party’s approval of the
information contained in the electronic
communication; and 
n That method has been as reliable as
appropriate for the purpose for which the
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electronic communication was generated or
communicated, in the light of all the
circumstances, including any relevant
agreement.3
In other words, the Draft Convention allows for
the use of any kind of electronic signature, and
incorporates the concept of risk by considering the
reliability and propriety of the authentication
method and the force of the agreements, within
which administrative means of authentication may
be considered.
In relation to the principles of e-GP, the
UNCITRAL Working Group I (Procurement) Report
for its sixth session (Vienna, September 2004)
recognized that efficient and reliable electronic
procurement systems require appropriate controls
as regards security, confidentiality and authenticity
of submissions, and integrity of data, for which
special rules and standards might need to be
formulated. In particular, it noted the convenience
of guiding principles, which might form a useful
basis for any future rules or guidance on the use
of electronic communications in the procurement
process. The core principles that have been stated
by the UNCITRAL Working Group I (Procurement)
were the following: 
n The means of communication imposed should
not present an unreasonable barrier to
participation in the procurement proceedings
(a principle that would allow a requirement for
paper-based or electronic communications in
appropriate circumstances);
n There should be appropriate procedures and
systems to establish the origin of
communications (authenticity); 
n The means and mechanisms used should be
such as to ensure that the integrity of data is
preserved; 
n The means used should enable the time of
receipt of documents to be established, if the
time of receipt were significant in applying the
rules of the procurement process (i.e. for
submission of requests to participate and for
tenders and proposals);
n The means and mechanisms used should
ensure that tenders and other significant
documents were not accessed by the
procuring entity or other persons prior to any
deadline, so as to prevent procuring entities’
passing information on other tenders to
favoured suppliers and to prevent competitors
from gaining access to that information
themselves (security);
n The confidentiality of information submitted
by or relating to other suppliers is maintained.
There was general agreement within the
Working Group that the above principles provided
a good basis for the formulation of specific rules,
standards or guidance on the matter.
As well as being consistent with the MDBs core
principles, the UNCITRAL Working Group I
(Procurement) Report for its seventh session (New
York, April 2005), has suggested that the
Secretariat include a provision in an early section of
the Procurement Model Law, as a new article 4,
promulgating the general principles of functional
equivalence and technological neutrality to be
observed in various actions taken in the course of
the procurement process, such as publication of
opportunities and procurement-related
information, communication between, for
example, procuring entities and suppliers, opening
of tenders and holding pre-tender conferences.
Such a general provision, it was observed, should
eliminate obstacles to, and ambiguities in, the use
of electronic means of communication in public
procurement under the Model Law and encourage
such use by amending all phrases implying a solely
paper-based environment, such as “writing”,
“sealed envelope”, “signature” or “record-
keeping”, without being overly prescriptive or
rendering the Model Law more complex.
Discussion and conclusion 
These parallel developments by the MDBs and
UNCITRAL represent an important shift in the
management of on-line authentication as well as a
maturing of its understanding. The earlier partial
convergence between model law and technology
around PKI models for authentication has now
dissolved. There is now a convergence between
the law and risk management that distances itself
from any technology. A further critical
development in this regard is the recognition by
UNCITRAL that the authentication methodology
should be commensurate with risk. This latter
development does two things: firstly it opens the
door for traditional administrative processes, and
secondly requires that the risks implicit within
technologies such as PKI be recognised and
measured.
These developments now create a tension
between the directions of the law (and the MDBs)
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and the e-GP processes being adopted by some
governments. Whereas previously it could have
been presumed that business practice was out-of-
step with technology and the law, it might now be
said that technology (or its application of PKI to e-
GP) is out-of-step with model law and business
practice. Governments that are locking e-GP into
PKI need to be clear about their risks and
objectives. With government procurement
representing a significant part of the economy and
the leadership role of government in many
developing countries, care needs to be taken that
locking e-GP into PKI does not embed standards
that may become superseded and which have
unresolved problems of their own. Herein lays a
strength of the administrative approach to e-GP
authentication over the legal approach. 
Also for some applications, PKI with all of its
management issues, costs and lack of standards,
would seem to add little to security that is not
already available within an SSL transmission that
has no such problems. The authorization that is
supposed to be assured by PKI has been managed
by other administrative means by the great bulk of
businesses and by some governments, and model
law now formally recognises this.
The MDBs have adopted a prudent course by
maintaining a technologically neutral position on
this issue and focussing instead on the protection
of core principles of governance. Within the
context of these core principles, the MDBs would
be open to considering various options for
authentication. UNCITRAL and the MDBs do not
suggest that countries close the door on PKI, but
that they open the door for other technological
and risk management responses including
traditional administrative processes that can
continue to apply in the e-GP environment. n
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